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mimic their perspective and thus relate their observable, physical 
point‑of‑view to their private, internal mental state. In this review, 
I argue that gaze following is foundational to this ability, is present 
early in development and across many species, and relies upon simi‑
lar neural systems in humans and related nonhuman animals.
Observed Gaze and natural behaviOr
Adult humans attend where others attend, and use gestures and gaze 
to manipulate the attention of others. At their pinnacle, these skills 
evoke mutual awareness of shared mental states (Emery, 2000); 
at their base, they are founded on a reflexive tendency to follow 
the gaze of others. The two essential features that describe adult 
use of deictic gaze are sophistication and automaticity. Typical 
human adults understand that gaze both constrains what another 
can see and signals what in the visual field they find most relevant. 
Our tendency to follow gaze reflects our understanding of one 
another’s point of view – our understanding of the significance of 
spatial relationships, our recognition that people can look toward 
things outside our field of view and that we can see things out‑
side theirs, and our awareness that gaze reflects the mental state 
of the gazer. Furthermore, we understand that gaze interacts with 
other communicative signals, and can have explicitly communica‑
tive (“ostentive”) significance, either to inform or mislead. For all 
these reasons, we use gaze to inform our judgments both about 
our shared environment and also about the person whose gaze 
we observe (e.g. Bayliss and Tipper, 2006b; Bayliss et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, we process all this so easily that we barely notice the 
effort – an automaticity that can be used against us, for example, 
in the no‑look passes of ballgames or magic tricks of illusionists 
(Kuhn et al., 2009).
Not only does gaze comprise an important communicative 
channel among typical adults, it appears to strongly influence our 
early development (Figure 1). The first study of gaze following by 
infants reported onset at 2 months, with steep increases in frequency 
between 7 and 11 months (Scaife and Bruner, 1975). Later work 
pushed this back slightly (reviewed, Butterworth, 1991), suggesting 
When we need to know what another individual thinks, we look to 
their eyes. In so doing, we learn not just about their visual focus, but 
also make inferences about their private thoughts and intentions, 
and about the messages they explicitly communicate to others. It is 
likely that distinct neural systems have evolved to process two crucial 
types of gaze information: direct and deictic (“pointing”) gaze.
Direct gaze is associated with predation and with the likelihood 
that an individual will approach or engage the observer: Because 
direct gaze is an unambiguous stimulus with tremendous evo‑
lutionary significance, neural responses are relatively automatic 
(von Grunau and Anston, 1995; Senju and Hasegawa, 2005), innate 
(Batki et al., 2000; Farroni et al., 2002; see also Grossmann et al., 
2007), and mediated by evolutionarily conserved subcortical sys‑
tems (Sewards and Sewards, 2002; Senju and Johnson, 2009).
By contrast, if observed gaze is averted, its direction is primarily 
relevant to individuals adapted to life in a social group. Deictic gaze 
indicates spatial attention, suggests future actions, and defines the 
target of facial signals (van Hoof, 1967; Argyle and Cook, 1976). Our 
ability to attend the same thing as an observed individual appears 
to be a foundation for more sophisticated social skills such as a 
theory of mind (Baron‑Cohen, 1994; Gomez, 2009); conversely, 
humans who are unable to or uninterested in sharing attention are 
understood to suffer symptoms of the autism spectrum disorders 
(APA, 1994).
Gaze‑following behavior sits at the intersection of several major 
strains of scientific research, and has thus been reviewed through 
several lenses over the past two decades: ethological (Emery, 2000; 
Itakura, 2004; Emery and Clayton, 2009; Rosati and Hare, 2009), 
psychological (Frischen et al., 2007), developmental and clinical 
(Nation and Penny, 2008), and neuroscientific (Nummenmaa and 
Calder, 2009). I’ll draw across these disciplines to highlight how 
behavioral research on gaze following informs our understanding 
of the neural mechanisms of social interaction.
To  understand  what  another  individual  sees,  we  must  per‑
ceive and interpret their body, head and eye posture, extract from 
these their gaze direction, and then covertly imagine or overtly 
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infants first look in the direction of gaze by 6 months, toward target 
objects by 12 months, and geometrically to objects beyond their 
immediate view at 18 months (but c.f. Moll and Tomasello, 2004). 
Geometrical gaze following is particularly intriguing, because it 
implies successful generalization between allocentric and egocen‑
tric space. At this point – starting a little over 1 year of age – infants 
preferentially follow the gaze of individuals whose eyes are open and 
uncovered (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2002, 2005) and who have looked 
toward interesting things (Chow et al., 2008). Likewise, year‑old 
infants actively manipulate attention via pointing hand gestures 
(Brooks and Meltzoff, 2002; Liszkowski et al., 2004), generally in 
tandem with either eye contact or deictic gaze.
Curiously, while humans follow gaze within a year after birth, 
explicit discrimination of gaze direction arises only in the third year, 
and remains imprecise for years thereafter (Doherty et al., 2009). 
This finding suggests that gaze behaviors may involve multiple sub‑
strates with distinct developmental time courses: at minimum a 
fast‑developing pathway for reflexive gaze‑following responses and 
a slower‑developing pathway for cognitive gaze comprehension.
Joint attention abilities at 10 months predict the rapidity of 
subsequent  language  acquisition  (Brooks  and  Meltzoff,  2005, 
2008; Mundy et al., 2007; though c.f. Tomasello and Farrar, 1986). 
Conversely,  poor  joint  attention  skills  predict  the  severity  of 
impairment from autism spectrum disorders (see also Klin et al., 
2002b; Charman, 2003; Nation and Penny, 2008). Some develop‑
mental evidence suggests that initiation of and response to joint 
attention are separable processes which make independent con‑
tributions to social and language development (see Mundy et al., 
2007) (note also Brooks and Meltzoff, 2008; Wellman et al., 2008; 
Pyers  and  Senghas,  2009).  This  developmental  heterogeneity 
likely includes   independent contributions of social perceptions, 
reflexes, and   motivations to the development of social attention, 
learning, behavior and cognition (see Klein et al., 2009). If different 
  differently‑developing mechanisms support orienting responses 
and mentalistic interpretations evoked by gaze, these mechanisms 
may also differ across phylogeny, and may be detectable and dis‑
sectible through psychophysical testing of behavior.
Gaze FOllOwinG by nOnhuman species
There is a certain inherent difficulty in generalizing deictic social 
cues across species. Among humans, cues are readily interpreted 
and categorized: heads, especially eyes, point toward attended 
regions;  bodies,  especially  hands,  point  in  the  direction  of 
intended movement or action. But human hands and eyes are 
both rather unique. Humans have a developed sense of vision 
and distinctive eyes: each has a small, single, circular, well‑defined 
fovea, and is pigmented so as to be easily readably by others 
(Kobayashi and Kohshima, 2001). Human hands are similarly 
specialized – freed from locomotor constraints by our bipedal 
stance, we use them to the exclusion of other more typical effec‑
tors such as the mouth. In many animals, quite different percep‑
tual and motor interfaces rule – consider that unlike a human, 
the robin turns its head aside the better to see the worm. The 
deictic social cues that apply to other species may not be readily 
apparent to us, nor ours to them.
Nonetheless,  group‑living  animals  must  coordinate  their 
movements with their group‑mates, and predators must like‑
wise coordinate with the movements of their prey. It would be 
surprising if these processes occurred without some minimal 
awareness and attention to the intended movements of others 
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FIgure 1 | Ontogeny of primate gaze following. Humans, apes, and 
monkeys are sensitive to direct gaze at, or soon after, birth. However, their 
understanding of deictic gaze develops during childhood. Human gaze following 
arises early in life, with responses to turned heads and averted eyes arising 
between 2–6 months; gaze following at 10–12 months predicts language 
acquisition over the next year. Near the 1-year mark, human gaze following 
becomes more sophisticated: it is contingent on cue’s eyes being open at 
11 months, and on the cue having recently looked at interesting things by 
14 months; by 18 months, humans follow gaze geometrically to regions beyond 
their immediate line of sight. By contrast, much less is known about the 
development of nonhuman gaze following. Apes and monkeys both appear 
more sensitive to head direction than to eyes. Both habituate to misleading gaze 
cues during adolescence, and as adults, follow gaze geometrically and from eye 
cues; the precise onset of these abilities is uncertain.Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  3
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(Figure 2). Most research, however, has examined the ability of 
animals not to understand one another’s gaze, but to interpret 
our own. After some debate, it now seems likely that apes and 
monkeys, at least, will shift their attention in response to human 
gaze and gesture (chimps, Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; chimps and 
an orangutan, but not lower primates, Itakura, 1996; capuchins, 
Anderson et al., 1996; macaques but not lemurs, Anderson and 
Mitchell, 1999; all great apes Brauer et al., 2005; and marmosets, 
Burkart and Heschl, 2006). Furthermore, some of these primates 
have been shown to follow gaze geometrically, indicating at least 
a limited understanding of another’s point of view (spider mon‑
keys and capuchins, Amici et al., 2009; apes, Brauer et al., 2005; 
marmosets, Burkart and Heschl, 2006). These studies contrast 
strikingly with primates’ failure to use human gaze or gesture 
to locate hidden food – a seeming paradox, and important area 
of comparative research (Hare and Tomasello, 2004; Miklosi 
and Soproni, 2006; Ruiz et al., 2008) (for further discussion, see 
Rosati and Hare, 2009).
Intriguingly, use of human deictic cues is also found in nonpri‑
mate species; in particular, certain domestic species succeed in 
those cooperative tasks primates often fail. Both goats (Kaminski 
et al., 2005) and horses (Maros et al., 2008) have a limited ability 
to follow pointing cues (however, c.f. Miklosi and Soproni, 2006). 
Impressively, dogs both follow (Soproni et al., 2001; Miklosi et al., 
2003) and direct (Miklosi et al., 2000, 2003) human gaze, suggest‑
ing a robust ability to share attention with humans. Domestication 
may select animals partly for their ability to socialize across species 
boundaries: for example, dogs follow human gaze more readily 
than do human‑reared wolves (Miklosi et al., 2003; see also Hare 
et al., 2002).
Besides primates and domesticated animals, some birds and 
marine mammals have been shown to respond to deictic signals. 
Corvids, including crows, magpies and jays, are known for advanced 
abilities including tool use (reviewed Clayton and Emery, 2005) 
and perhaps mirror recognition (Prior et al., 2008) – and also pos‑
sess the ability to geometrically follow human gaze cues (Bugnyar 
et al., 2004; reviewed, Emery and Clayton, 2009). Outside the corvid 
family, ibises have been shown to follow gaze, but lack the abil‑
ity to follow gaze geometrically (Loretto et al., 2010). Among sea 
mammals, dolphins and seals have some ability to follow pointing 
gestures (Shapiro et al., 2003), and perhaps also head gaze cues 
(Pack and Herman, 2004). These results are somewhat surprising, 
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FIgure 2 | Phylogeny of vertebrate gaze following. Though the most robust 
evidence for gaze following has emerged from primates, other mammals and 
birds have also been found to follow gaze. Evidence comes primarily from three 
groups: domestic mammals including goats and dogs, captive cetaceans 
including dolphins and seals, and birds including corvids and ibises. Better 
understanding of the evolution of gaze behavior will require more comparative 
studies, with a particular eye toward distinguishing both the sophistication and 
species-specificity of gaze cue responses.Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  4
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naturalistic interaction among ringtailed lemurs, who, like all 
prosimian primates, were not previously known to follow gaze 
(Shepherd and Platt, 2008) (Figure 3).
The ability of other primates to follow human gaze appears to 
grow throughout development (Ferrari et al., 2000, 2008; Tomasello 
et al., 2001; Okamoto et al., 2002) (Figure 1). An important theme 
has emerged that while humans follow eye gaze from an early age, 
other apes initially follow only head direction, responding to eye 
gaze alone only in adulthood (Tomasello et al., 2007). This finding, 
together with the observation that human eyes are unusually visible 
(Kobayashi and Kohshima, 2001), suggests the “cooperative eye” 
hypothesis: that adaptations promoting joint attention may have 
evolved among human ancestors as we became more interdepend‑
ent (Tomasello et al., 2005, 2007).
Studies of interacting animals hold three major benefits for 
humans. First, comparisons between species may help us learn 
how social communication and orienting evolved prior to the 
advent of human language. Second, identifying the foundations 
for human abilities in nonhuman animals increases the tractability 
with which we investigate how specific genes and neural circuits 
contribute to social behavior. Third, because humans modify basic 
gaze behaviors in response to cultural and contextual pressures 
(Argyle and Cook, 1976; Kleinke, 1986) – likely including   awareness 
and   suggest an important role for domain‑general learning: It’s 
difficult to imagine marine mammals evolving an intrinsic ability 
to decode arm gestures.
While the ability of these animals to track human cues is impres‑
sive, the more ethologically relevant question is whether animals 
use deictic gaze cues in interactions with their own species. Even 
when animals can successfully perceive and respond to the deictic 
cues of another species, they may not typically be motivated to 
attend or react. Surprisingly few studies, however, have addressed 
the use of gaze cues among nonhuman species – it is difficult 
to observe gaze shifts from a distance, and more difficult still to 
arrange controlled and naturalistic interaction. Some primate spe‑
cies, notably chimpanzees, bonobos, and perhaps capuchins, may 
spontaneously attempt to direct others’ attention through gestures 
(de Waal, 2003; Zimmermann et al., 2009). Similar observations 
have been made in social hunters such as wolves (see Miklosi and 
Soproni, 2006). These observations imply their complement, and 
recent data have supported the idea that diverse animals can read 
deictic social cues: chimps, mangabeys, and several species of 
macaque, (Tomasello et al., 1998), domesticated goats, (Kaminski 
et al., 2005), and dogs (Hare and Tomasello, 1999). Similarly, novel 
monitoring techniques (e.g. Shepherd and Platt, 2006) have made 
it possible to record subtle use of conspecific gaze cues during 
FIgure 3 | Lemurs use deictic social cues to guide naturalistic orienting. 
Upper: New technologies permit human and nonhuman gaze to be recorded 
during naturalistic interaction. These techniques can reveal subtle patterns of 
signaling which are difficult to detect in the field or evoke in the laboratory. 
Michael Platt and I recorded infrared video (A) of a lemur’s eye, as reflected in a 
dichroic mirror (B), while simultaneously recording (C) the scene in front of the 
lemur and transmitting (D) both data sets to a computer for extraction of gaze 
location. Though lemurs reportedly ignore human gaze cues, they nonetheless 
co-oriented with one another in natural settings, and tended to follow the gaze 
of individuals they had recently looked at. Lower: Co-orienting statistics: across 
the analyzed videos, the lemur subject tended to look in the direct of the 
outward red lines, and avoid the direction of the inward blue lines, relative to 
observed lemurs’ body (larger circle) and head (smaller circle) axes (methods, 
Shepherd and Platt, 2006; results, Shepherd and Platt, 2008).Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  5
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and Cohen, 1984; Muller and Rabbitt, 1989). Reflexive orienting 
(exogenous, automatic, bottom‑up, stimulus‑driven) was evoked 
locally by abrupt changes in a region of space, with attentional 
deployments arising and fading quickly. In contrast, voluntary 
attention (endogenous, conscious, top‑down, or goal‑directed) 
was evoked by distant, complex or symbolic cues that make task‑
relevant predictions, and resulting attentional deployments are slow 
and sustained.
This framework sets up three key questions about psychophysi‑
cal responses to observed gaze: First, do they result from a reflexive 
social module, from voluntary, domain‑general orienting decisions, 
or via multiple pathways? Second, how does reflexive gaze following 
relate to comprehension of gaze behavior and viewpoint? Third, 
how does gaze‑following behavior vary across individuals, and what 
can this tell us about the neural mechanisms of gaze response?
reFlexivity
Friesen and Kingstone (1998) showed that nonpredictive eye gaze 
cues influenced subjects’ reaction times and accuracy at detecting, 
localizing,  and  discriminating  peripheral  targets.  Furthermore, 
the time course strongly suggested that these attentional effects 
were reflexive, arising after only 105 ms. The next year, Langton 
and Bruce (1999) found parallel results using head‑gaze cues, and 
Driver et al. (1999) reported that subjects followed gaze even when 
cues were counterpredictive of eventual target location (Figure 4). 
Together, these results strongly supported the existence of a reflex‑
ive,  informationally‑encapsulated  module  mediating  human 
gaze following.
Importantly, this gaze‑following reflex appears to arise early in 
development, consistent with its proposed importance in guiding 
social learning. In the laboratory, young infants followed pho‑
tographed eye gaze (and not tongue movement), however, gaze 
following in the youngest infants was masked by a reluctance to 
disengage the face cue (Hood et al., 1998; Farroni et al., 2000; see 
also Reid and Striano, 2005). Biological motion appears to be cru‑
of research surveillance – nonhuman animals may provide the most 
  straightforward model for studying gaze behavior in natural, spon‑
taneous social interaction.
To use animals as a model for human gaze‑following behavior, 
however, we must also determine whether they follow gaze in the 
same manner as humans. What stimuli drive responses to averted 
gaze: head or eye movement, facial feature configuration, ocular con‑
trast? Does gaze‑following behavior arise from a simple orienting 
reflex in two‑ or three‑dimensional space, or is it instead mediated 
by the fully‑fledged representation of another’s subjective viewpoint? 
Is gaze following a type of innately‑specified reflex, a simple learned 
association, or a conscious behavioral strategy? As we have discussed, 
at least some animals use both head and eye cues to define gaze and 
follow gaze geometrically, but even of these, many seem to have sur‑
prising difficulty using observed gaze to guide behavior. Definitive 
answers to these questions will require psychophysical decomposi‑
tion of animal responses to gaze. The answers to these questions 
determine not only the suitability of animal models for the study of 
human social cognition, but have implications for the evolved neural 
architecture and cognitive processes that shape social behavior.
psychOphysics OF Gaze FOllOwinG
The human ability to represent other minds, researchers have argued, 
arose through development of a sequence of explicitly social modules. 
Specifically, Baron‑Cohen (1994) argued that the four crucial mod‑
ules were an eye direction detector, intentionality detector, shared 
attention mechanism, and theory of mind mechanism. Emery and 
Perrett refined this idea slightly (see Emery, 2000), proposing two 
modular detectors: one each for direct and deictic attention. Both 
proposals were grounded in Fodor’s (1983) framework, in which 
modularity “is fundamentally a matter of information encapsulation” 
and acts to facilitate efficient, speedy, reflexive processing.
Such claims made strong predictions about how deictic gaze 
should influence attention. Attention had traditionally been dichot‑
omized as either reflexive or voluntary (Jonides, 1981; Posner 
FIgure 4 | Humans follow gaze reflexively. (A) Faces gazing left or right were presented for 100, 300, or 700ms, followed by a response target which appeared 
opposite gaze four times as often as it appeared in the gazed direction. (B) For the first half-second after cue onset, subjects responded faster to targets appearing in 
the direction of observed gaze -- despite their knowledge these targets were less likely (adapted from Driver et al., 1999).Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  6
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However,  contextual  variables  that  enhance  gaze  following 
  generally appear to operate by increasing social cue saliency (e.g. 
Ristic and Kingstone, 2005; Birmingham et al., 2008). A number of 
studies have linked joint attention deficits to a failure to fixate the 
eye region (e.g. Klin et al., 2002a; Adolphs et al., 2005; Dalton et al., 
2005). Failure to fixate the eyes deprives the brain of high‑resolution 
visuosocial information, and may indicate a broader insensitiv‑
ity to (or avoidance of) social stimuli. Eye gaze perception may 
be especially disrupted when presented outside the fovea (Burton 
et al., 2009), and while gaze‑following responses have not been 
explicitly probed in the periphery, several studies suggest that overt 
attention toward an individual increases the likelihood their gaze 
will be followed (by humans inspecting photographs, Dukewich 
et al., 2008; Fletcher‑Watson et al., 2008; by interacting lemurs, 
Shepherd and Platt, 2008). It is clear that saliency modulates gaze 
following, but less clear whether this is the only means of affect‑
ing the gaze‑  following response. If gaze following is modulated by 
social context in a manner that does not alter cue saliency – for 
example, by changing whether viewed individuals are cooperators 
or competitors – this would strongly militate against a distinct 
gaze‑following module. For example, the recent finding that gaze‑
following responses may reverse in some salient real‑world interac‑
tions (Nummenmaa et al., 2009) further undermines the case for 
an encapsulated gaze‑following module.
Diverse deictic cues are known to quickly and reflexively drive 
attention, including photographed eye gaze, head gaze, gaze in sche‑
matic faces, eyes alone, and ambiguous faces (at least once recognized 
as such – see Ristic and Kingstone, 2005) (reviewed, Frischen et al., 
2007). Recently, however, it has been argued that symbolic nonsocial 
cues may also drive reflexive orienting. Though early studies found 
nonpredictive arrows to have little or no effect on orienting (e.g. 
Jonides, 1981; more recently, Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Friesen et al., 
2004), it now appears likely that arrows exert fast, reflexive influ‑
ence on attention (e.g. Tipples, 2002; Kuhn and Kingstone, 2009). If 
cial to these early responses to gaze, and though infants correctly 
ignored tongue movements (Hood et al., 1998), their tendency 
to follow gaze was confounded when gaze shifts were produced 
by translating the face outline rather than the eyes themselves 
(Farroni et al., 2000). Importantly, gaze following by infants may 
be contingent on ostentive signals: mutual gaze, and especially 
infant‑directed speech, increases the likelihood a gaze cue will 
be followed (Farroni et al., 2003; Senju and Csibra, 2008). These 
results suggest a gaze‑following reflex operates both in adults and 
in the youngest children ever tested, but that gaze responses may 
be sensitive to context.
Gaze following by nonhuman animals, too, appears reflexive. 
Deaner and Platt (2003) showed that humans and macaques reflex‑
ively orient attention in response to nonpredictive gaze cues; fur‑
thermore, the shared dynamics of human and monkey responses 
implied shared mechanisms (Figure 5) (see also Emery et al., 
1997; Shepherd et al., 2006; but cf. Shepherd et al., in press). This 
further supported the notion that primate gaze‑following behav‑
ior was mediated by a specialized, reflexive neural module.
However, gaze following can be modulated by social context   
(reviewed, Frischen et al., 2007). We have already noted that osten‑
tive cues potentiate gaze following in infants; similarly, emotional 
expressions may sometimes potentiate reflexive gaze following 
in both humans (Mathews et al., 2003; Hori et al., 2005; Putman 
et al., 2006; but see Hietanen and Leppanen, 2003) and monkeys 
(Goossens et al., 2008; but see Paukner et al., 2007), and likewise 
dominance has been found to influence gaze following in both 
species  (humans,  Jones  et al.,  2010;  monkeys,  Shepherd  et al., 
2006). Finally, familiarity (Deaner et al., 2007) and sexual interest 
(Khurana et al., 2009) have been suggested to influence human 
gaze following. These data indicate that gaze following cannot be 
modular in Fyodor’s strictest sense: if social context can dampen 
or accentuate gaze‑following responses, then the gaze‑following 
mechanism is not informationally encapsulated.
FIgure 5 | Anthropoids primates follow gaze with similar sub-second 
dynamics. (A) Monkeys and humans performed an identical task, in which they 
fixated a central face gazing left or right, and then looked toward a peripheral 
target. The target was not predicted by the gaze direction of the cue. 
(B) Monkeys and humans were faster to look toward targets appearing in the 
direction of cue gaze, independent of whether head or eye-only cue images 
were used. (C) The fixation positions of monkeys and humans shifted slightly in 
the direction of gaze, and did so with similar time course. Such fixation shifts are 
thought to result from microsaccadic drift biased in the direction of attention 
(adapted from Deaner and Platt, 2003).Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  7
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  periocular  luminance  can  reverse  gaze  percepts  (Sinha,  2000; 
Ando, 2002, 2004; though note Olk et al., 2008). Discussing their 
finding that children perform poorly at explicit gaze discrimina‑
tion long after they reflexively follow gaze, Doherty et al. (2009) 
proposed that luminance‑based gaze discrimination is innate and 
crude, while configural gaze discrimination is learned and pre‑
cise.  However,  this  observation  rests  uncomfortably  alongside 
(Tomasello et al., 2007) of a uniquely‑human “cooperative eye”: if 
responses to ocular luminance cues are the more primitive form 
of gaze following, why is it so difficult for nonhuman animals to 
follow gaze using eyes cues alone?
individual diFFerences in Gaze FOllOwinG
Gaze cues are ubiquitous in typical human social development, 
and a failure to respond to gaze cues is associated with patho‑
logical linguistic and social development. While congenitally blind 
humans do develop language and a theory of mind, including rela‑
tively normal “mirroring” (Bedny et al., 2009) and “mentalizing” 
(Ricciardi et al., 2009) networks, they often experience develop‑
mental delays in language and social behavior (Hobson and Bishop, 
2003). In sighted individuals, an absence of gaze following both 
eliminates an important developmental cue and may be sympto‑
matic of deeper dysfunction in social perception, motivation, or 
attention. Changes in visuosocial orienting are associated with a 
number of mental illnesses, including social anxiety (Bradley et al., 
1997; Compton, 2003; Horley et al., 2004), schizophrenia (Kington 
et al., 2000; Franck et al., 2002; Langdon et al., 2006), and especially 
autism. Autistic individuals lack the desire and ability “to share 
enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other people” (APA, 
1994), and while the root causes of autism remain controversial, 
there is general consensus that failures of joint attention are among 
the best predictors of autism in early childhood (reviewed, Nation 
and Penny, 2008).
Theorists have proposed that social deficits in autism may repre‑
sent an extreme of natural testosterone‑linked variation across indi‑
viduals (Baron‑Cohen, 2002). On average, women respond more 
strongly than men to social cues (Geary, 1998) and fetal testosterone 
is reported to negatively impact both social attention and social 
relationships among human juveniles (Knickmeyer and Baron‑
Cohen, 2006). In both humans and macaques, females follow gaze 
more than males (humans, Bayliss et al., 2005; monkeys, Paukner 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, testosterone‑linked social dominance 
appears to suppress gaze following by macaques (Shepherd et al., 
2006). These findings suggest that biological factors, especially those 
linked to sex hormones, may have a role in the neurobiology of 
gaze following.
Psychophysical variability in gaze following is interesting not just 
because of what it tells us about species, developmental, and indi‑
vidual differences in behavior, but because it suggests a framework 
with which to consider evolutionary, developmental, and individual 
differences in neural mechanisms. I outline our present state of 
knowledge about these neural mechanisms below.
neural mechanisms OF Gaze FOllOwinG
Biologically‑relevant stimuli are processed through both a fast, 
crude subcortical stream that is largely conserved across verte‑
brates, and through a slower, more nuanced cortical network that in 
  nonpredictive symbolic cues reflexively shift attention, then responses 
to deictic gaze may be wholly or partly mediated by generic, domain‑
general learning processes (reviewed, Birmingham and Kingstone, 
2009; Kingstone, 2009). This, too, would strongly militate against an 
innate, modular mechanism for following gaze.
In summary, fast gaze‑following responses appear to be quick 
and reflexive, consistent with mediation by an encapsulated neural 
module shared across (at least) all primates. However, the con‑
text sensitivity and broad selectivity of sub‑second gaze‑following 
responses suggests that they are well‑integrated with other social 
processes, and may be mediated by multiple neuronal pathways.
Gaze FOllOwinG vs. Gaze perceptiOn
The idea that gaze‑following behaviors might involve separate   systems 
– one fast, innate and reflexive, one “slow” and nuanced – may help 
resolve seeming contradictions in the developmental, comparative, 
and psychophysical literature encountered above. However, any such 
approach must carefully distinguish the cues which effectively stimu‑
late fast and slow gaze responses. In particular, it is relevant whether 
gaze cues are decoded equivalently when influencing reflexive gaze 
following and when informing gaze perception.
Two sets of results suggest gaze following and gaze perception 
might involve dissociable mechanisms: the first regards the preci‑
sion with which gaze is resolved, the second, how gaze responses 
integrate conflicting deictic cues. As Doherty et al. (2009) report 
in young children, it is possible for gaze following to occur in 
the absence of precise gaze perception (e.g. via motor contagion, 
reviewed Blakemore and Frith, 2005; note also Bayliss and Tipper, 
2006a). However, the precision of gaze‑following responses is not 
typically tested, and in a naturalistic change‑detection paradigm, 
gaze‑following responses appeared broadly tuned (Langton et al., 
2006). By contrast, adults can discriminate small differences in both 
deictic (Bock et al., 2008) and direct (Gamer and Hecht, 2007) gaze, 
treating gaze direction as a cone of approximately 6° width (see 
also Calder et al., 2008).
Another argument regards the different gaze cues being used. Our 
eyes strongly constrain our visual attention, while our head and body 
orientations pose weaker constraints on attention and action plan‑
ning: Eyes thus make stronger predictions about the spatial location 
of objects of interest. Similarly, when humans shift attention during 
natural behavior, inertia typically causes the eyes to lead the head, 
which in turn leads the body (Suzuki et al., 2008): Eyes thus make 
stronger predictions about the timing of visual stimuli than other 
somatic cues. In fact, extreme postural conflicts may sharpen this 
temporal prediction, strongly implying a recent or abrupt gaze shift. 
These observations pose the question of how gaze responses differ 
when head and eye orientations conflict. Current evidence suggests 
both that humans follow eye gaze more reliably than head direction 
(see Tomasello et al., 2007), and that gaze following of head cues 
is greater when a head is turned relative to the body than when at 
rest (Hietanen, 2002). By contrast, however, perceptual judgments 
of head gaze are confounded when head direction conflicts with the 
eyes (Langton, 2000; but c.f. Ricciardelli and Driver, 2008) or with 
pointing gestures (Langton and Bruce, 2000).
Eye gaze can be discriminated using crude luminance cues, while 
parsing head orientation would seem to require more complex 
and  flexible  configural  processing.  For  example,    manipulating Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  8
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  primates is highly derived (Sewards and Sewards, 2002; Vuilleumier, 
2002a; Johnson, 2005). Gaze sensitivity has been reported in both 
pathways, though deictic gaze representations are most strongly 
supported in cortex: in particular, two meta‑analyses have identified 
gaze sensitivity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the dorsal 
and ventral frontoparietal attention networks (Grosbras et al., 2005; 
Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009). Neither the “simple” question 
of how these perceptions influence orienting, nor the more com‑
plex question of how they interact with cognitive processes such 
as shared attention and theory of mind, are definitively answered. 
We have, however, begun to trace pathways by which deictic gaze 
signals are processed in the brain (Figure 6).
the subcOrtical pathway
The subcortical visual pathway, in humans, is hypothesized to flow 
from the retina to the superior colliculus, the pulvinar, and the 
amygdala (Morris et al., 1999; Johnson, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006). 
Each of these regions can modulate processing in other parts of 
the brain and thus influence attention; furthermore, each receives 
descending projections from socially‑activated cortices such as 
the fusiform gyrus, extrastriate body area and superior temporal 
sulcus (colliculus, Fries, 1984; amygdala, Ghashghaei and Barbas, 
2002;  pulvinar,  Romanski  et al.,  1997;  Stefanacci  and  Amaral, 
2002). The amygdala, in particular, is sensitive to observed gaze 
  (monkey   electrophysiology, Gothard et al., 2007; Hoffman et al., 
2007; human imaging, Kawashima et al., 1999) and is known to play 
a role in social saliency processing (Morris et al., 1999; Vuilleumier, 
2002a; Adolphs, 2008). Intriguingly, the amygdala is sexually dimor‑
phic (Goldstein et al., 2001), and its dysfunction may contribute 
to autism (Schultz, 2005), suggesting it is a nexus through which 
testosterone could influence gaze responses. The amygdala has 
not yet been shown to represent deictic gaze, as opposed to threat 
and flirtation‑linked eye contact signals; but lesion studies now 
implicate amygdala in both intentional and reflexive gaze‑follow‑
ing behaviors (Akiyama et al., 2007; Okada et al., 2008). Moreover, 
while the amygdala does not directly project to the visual orienting 
system, and may only coarsely differentiate regions of visual space, 
these characteristics are consistent with the fast gaze‑following 
responses discussed above.
the superiOr tempOral sulcus
Social processing areas may be among those cortices homologous 
across all primates (Tootell et al., 2003; Rosa and Tweedale, 2005) 
and perhaps other mammals as well (Kendrick et al., 2001). The first 
neurons sensitive to observed gaze were reported in macaques near 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Perrett et al., 1982, 1985), and 
imaging subsequently revealed similar gaze‑sensitivity near human 
STS (reviewed, Allison et al., 2000), especially when observing sur‑
prising or incongruous gaze behavior (Pelphrey et al., 2003).
However, the STS is a large area that contains multiple subre‑
gions. Cellular structure and connectivity vary across both its width 
and length, and while posterior regions communicate both with 
posterior parietal and frontal areas, anterior regions communicate 
preferentially with frontal and visual cortices (Seltzer and Pandya, 
1989, 1991). Neurons in the middle anterior upper bank of the STS 
represent gaze direction independently of whether it arises through 
head or eye posture (Perrett et al., 1992); notably, while more caudal 
neurons respond symmetrically to gaze averted to either the right or 
left, anterior neurons differentiate deictic gaze direction (De Souza 
et al., 2005; see also Jellema et al., 2000). Though imaging studies 
have shown peak gaze sensitivity in posterior STS (Allison et al., 
2000; c.f. Grosbras et al., 2005; Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009), a 
recent adaptation study by Calder et al. (2007) showed that human 
neurons with deictic gaze sensitivity are concentrated in anterior 
STS, just as in macaques. Two split‑brain patients reflexively fol‑
lowed gaze only in one visual hemifield, consistent with cortical 
mediation by a single hemisphere specialized for face processing 
(Kingstone et al., 2000). Lesions of STS are rare, but one patient 
with a large right superior temporal gyrus lesion had difficulty 
perceiving (Akiyama et al., 2006a) and failed to reflexively follow 
(Akiyama et al., 2006b) gaze.
the extended sOcial prOcessinG netwOrk
Core visuosocial areas in the fusiform gyrus and STS interact with 
an extended face processing network, integrating body and face 
perceptions with contextual signals from areas including hippoc‑
ampus, amygdala, and orbitofrontal cortext (OFC) (Ishai et al., 
2005; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). These interlinked areas 
comprise a functional circuit that modulates perceptual and sen‑
sorimotor processing based on emotional and mnemonic associa‑
tions (Sabbagh, 2004; Smith et al., 2006; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 
1 2
3
4
1 2
3
4
FIgure 6 | Potential mechanisms for gaze-following behavior. Two 
general pathways (shown here, schematically) could relate observed gaze to 
visual attention. At left, in blue, visual information travels from the retina to the 
lateral geniculate (1), the early visual areas (2), the social processing areas 
along the superior temporal sulcus (3), and finally toward attention control 
circuitry including the lateral intraparietal area, frontal eye fields, and superior 
colliculus (4). At right, in red, a hypothesized subcortical pathway travels 
directly from the retina to the superior colliculus (1), to the pulvinar nucleus of 
the thalamus (2), and to the amygdala (3). The subcortical pathway could 
influence attention locally in the superior colliculus or pulvinar, or via 
projections from amygdala to the early visual areas (4).Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  9
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2007); interestingly, each of these structures is sexually dimorphic 
(Goldstein et al., 2001). Perception of averted gaze has been reported 
to activate neurons in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (Calder 
et al., 2002; see also Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009), possibly joined 
by the left superior frontal gyrus during bouts of coordinated joint 
attention (Williams et al., 2005). Lesion data in one patient suggests 
that frontal areas F7, F10 and F11 may be necessary for social and 
symbolic attention (Vecera and Rizzo, 2004). The extended social 
processing network is particularly interesting in that it comprises a 
network through which individual and contextual variables might 
modulate gaze‑following responses.
the FrOntOparietal attentiOn netwOrks
Cortical social perception areas project to frontoparietal attention 
areas (c.f. Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) including macaque areas 7A 
and the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) (Seltzer and Pandya, 1991) and 
the supplementary and frontal eye fields (SEF and FEF) (Seltzer and 
Pandya, 1989). To mediate orienting decisions, these areas must bal‑
ance the costs and benefits of attention shifts, including those resulting 
from either social or nonsocial stimuli (reviewed, Klein et al., 2009). Of 
these areas, LIP is especially intriguing, because it receives projections 
from the STS and integrates oculomotor rewards (intrinsic social, 
Klein et al., 2008; instructed nonsocial, Platt and Glimcher, 1999) into 
a unified saliency map (Colby and Goldberg, 1999).
My colleagues and I have recently reported (Shepherd et al., 
2009) that some neurons in LIP act as mirror neurons (reviewed, 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) for attentional states, responding 
both when orienting toward a region of space and when observing 
another individual oriented toward this same location. Strikingly, 
however, these neurons were outnumbered, in our study, by neu‑
rons that became less active when nonpredictive gaze cues were 
oriented toward their response field. These findings indicate that 
LIP neurons weigh deictic social information when computing 
visual saliency, even when this information arises from outside 
their local response fields. However, they further suggest that the 
fastest reflexive gaze‑following responses may arise outside LIP, and 
that, under these conditions, LIP acted primarily to tamp down 
a prepotent but task‑irrelevant gaze‑following response. In this 
account, LIP primarily mediates those deictic gaze responses which 
are modulated by intrinsic social reward (c.f. Shepherd et al., 2006) 
and predictive value (c.f. Friesen et al., 2004).
It is important to note that human frontoparietal expansion has 
resulted in uncertain homology between human and nonhuman 
parietal lobes (Orban et al., 2004), nonetheless, two lines of inquiry 
have suggested that human parietal lobes, like those of the mon‑
key, play an important role in joint attention. First, the same study 
that revealed deictic gaze processing in anterior STS also identified 
directionally‑selective neurons in the human inferior parietal lobule 
(Calder et al., 2007). Second, several studies by Saxe and colleagues 
have strongly implicated the right temporoparietal junction in men‑
talizing (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; note also 
Mitchell, 2008), and it is quite possible that these abstract perspective‑
  taking abilities require similar neuronal computations to their more 
concrete variants. Both sets of findings are consonant with an fMRI 
meta‑analysis finding overlapping activations during orienting shifts 
and gaze perception (Grosbras et al., 2005; c.f. Nummenmaa and 
Calder, 2009). However, in four patients for whom parietal lesions 
had caused neglect, gaze following was unaffected – and moreover, 
compensated for the lesions by reflexively directing attention into 
the otherwise neglected hemifield (Vuilleumier, 2002b). These find‑
ings seem strikingly at odds with electrophysiological and imaging 
results suggesting involvement of posterior parietal cortex in joint 
attention, and warrant further investigation.
cOnclusiOn
Though neuroscience has made great strides over the past century, 
we have only a rudimentary understanding of how the brain medi‑
ates the social behaviors that fill – and give meaning to – our lives. 
Our tendency to follow gaze is a relatively simple, stereotyped, 
measurable window into the operation and development of the 
social brain, and one that interacts with diverse aspects of social 
cognition.
In adult humans, gaze following is both automatic and sophis‑
ticated. We are sensitive to direct gaze from birth, a sensitivity that 
appears widespread among vertebrates, and deictic gaze responses 
are observed in infant brains and behavior by 4 months of age. 
Infant  participation  in  shared  attention  correlates  with  later 
language learning and theory of mind development, likely both 
through direct contributions and because it indexes underlying 
social interest and motivation. Geometrical gaze following, in par‑
ticular, involves a generalization from egocentric to allocentric space 
thus seems like an important foundation for perspective‑  taking 
abilities and the attribution of mental states. Curiously, however, 
human toddlers capable of geometrical gaze‑following nonetheless 
have difficulty when asked to explicitly report gaze direction. Gaze 
following is widespread among primates and may also be evident 
in nonprimate species including dogs, marine mammals, and some 
birds, but even species that follow gaze geometrically often have 
difficulty using gaze to guide behavioral decisions. Such cooperative 
gaze behavior may have limited adaptive utility in species that lack 
cooperative social interactions. Social partnerships, including those 
between humans and between species during domestication, likely 
act to facilitate the evolution of joint attention abilities.
Gaze‑following behavior appears partially reflexive, but is, at 
minimum, modulated by factors effecting cue saliency. Though gaze 
signals are parsed and attended through socially‑specific processing 
mechanisms, it remains uncertain whether gaze following operates 
via a specialized module, via domain‑general learning mechanisms, 
or both. It is quite possible that multiple mechanisms exist, and are 
differentially active across developmental timepoints, species, or 
pathologies. Distinct visual cues, such as periocular luminance or 
facial feature configuration, may drive these mechanisms. Across 
both normal and pathological populations, variant levels of joint 
attention suggest that underlying neural mechanisms are sensitive to 
biological factors, notably including suppression by testosterone.
The pathway by which deictic gaze cues influence orienting 
remain unknown, but likely includes a fast and crude subcorti‑
cal pathway as well as a slower, more nuanced cortical pathway. 
Important questions include whether amygdala neurons differen‑
tiate between averted gaze directions; how posterior and anterior 
superior temporal sulcus regions differ in their contribution to 
social behavior; and, definitively, whether gaze‑following responses 
can be suppressed through reversible inactivation of amygdala, LIP 
or FEF, or posterior or anterior STS.Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  March 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 5  |  10
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